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Abstract 
This study explores the significance of firm-specific, country, and macroeconomic factors in explaining variation 
in leverage using a sample of banks from Turkish banking sector. The analysis is based on quarterly firm-level data 
from Turkish banking sector in 2002–2012. We aims to contribute to the empirical capital structure literature in the 
following ways. Our first contribution comes from assessing the importance of firm-specific factors, country-level 
factors and industrial factors for capital structure decisions in Turkish banking sector. Second, we employ 
appropriate and advanced dynamic panel data estimators, Blundell and Bond’s (1998) generalized methods of 
moment’s estimators (GMM System). We find that leverage is significantly and positively associated with average 
industry leverage, firm size and GDP growth. We find also that leverage is significantly and negatively associated 
with tangibility, profitability, inflation and financial risk. The regression results for leverage are both theoretically 
and empirically plausible for banks in Turkey. Moreover, tangibility, profitability and GDP growth are consistent 
with the predictions of the pecking order theory, while firm size is consistent with the predictions of the trade-off 
theory. Our findings suggest that the capital structures of financial and non-financial firms are ultimately 
determined by the same drivers.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Capital structure decisions affect a firm in two 
ways. Firstly, firms of the same risk class could possibly 
have higher cost of capital with higher leverage. 
Secondly, capital structure may affect the valuation of the 
firm, with more leveraged firms, being riskier, being 
valued lower than less leveraged firms. Thus, capital 
structure is an important decision for it could lead to an 
optimal financing mix which could maximize the market 
price of the firm (Lim, 2012). Studies on capital 
structures of corporations have a long history, dating 
back to the nineteen fifties with the appearance of the 
works of Lintner (1956), Hirshleifer (1958) and 
Modigliani and Miller (1958). Theoretical and empirical 
studies that followed subsequently form an extremely 
large body of literature. Modigliani and Miller (1958) 
showed that in the perfect financial market, under certain 
assumptions, the value of a company is independent of its 
financing choice. Firm capital structure is irrelevant in 
efficient financial markets as shown by Modigliani and 
Miller (1958).  
The issue of a given capital structure that may 
increase the shareholder value is one of the most 
important discussions in the finance field, both 
theoretically and empirically (Kayo and Kimura, 2011). 
Since Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) “capital structure 
irrelevance” propositions, we have been witnessing the 
development of many theoretical points of view in this 
arena. Subsequent theoretical work has taken into account 
the imperfections of financial markets and has shown that 
firm capital structure emerges from firm-specific and 
macroeconomic factors. The preponderance of the studies 
on capital structure mainly focuses on the analysis of 
certain firm characteristics–e.g., profitability, tangibility, 
size, etc.–as determinants of leverage. For example, 
Frank and Goyal (2009), Lemmon et al. (2008) evaluate 
the contribution of firm-specific factors to leverage 
variation of U.S. firms. The empirical studies on the 
capital structure choices of firms that started appearing in 
the eighties (Marsh, 1982; Jalilavand and Harris, 1984; 
Titman and Wessels, 1988) and continued later are 
mostly based on data from developed countries. Bevan 
and Danbolt (2002) use data from the U.K. and Gaud et 
al. (2005) analyzed data from Swiss companies. 
Recent and growing research has incorporated 
country-level characteristics into the traditional firm-level 
determinants to explain a firm's leverage. Several studies 
analyze the role of countries and industries on financing 
policies. These authors (Booth et al., 2001; Demirguc-
Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; Hanousek and Shamshur, 
2011; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Giannetti, 2003; 
Jõeveer, 2005; De Jong et al., 2008; Bancel and Mittoo, 
2004; Antoniou et al., 2008; Beck et al., 2008; Psillaki 
and Daskalakis, 2009; Gropp and Heider, 2010; 
Gungoraydinoglu and Oztekin, 2011; Kayo and Kimura, 
2011; Oztekin and Flannery, 2012; Joeveer, 2013 and 
Drobetz et al, 2013) suggest that, along with firm 
characteristics, country-specific factors may also 
influence firm capital structure. These studies compare 
the capital structure of firms from different countries, 
taking into account factors such as gross domestic 
product (GDP), inflation, development of stock markets, 
etc.  
Country characteristics influence firms' costs 
and benefits in determining their capital structure. 
Countries differ in the quality of institutions that may 
potentially affect the trade-off among the bankruptcy 
costs and tax benefits, agency costs, and information 
asymmetry costs imposed on firms (Gungoraydinoglu 
and Oztekin, 2011). Subsequent to the departures from 
Modigliani and Miller (1958)’s irrelevance proposition, 
there is a long tradition in corporate finance to investigate 
the capital structure decisions of non-financial firms. It is 
easy to find studies that analyze firm characteristics as 
determinants of capital structure, but, the literature often 
neglects the role of industry and country in banking 
sector.  
An early investigation of banks’ capital 
structures using a corporate finance approach is Marcus 
(1983). He examines the decline in capital to asset ratios 
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of US banks in the 1970s. Barth et al. (2005), Berger et 
al. (2008) and Brewer et al. (2008) observe that the levels 
of bank capital are much higher than the regulatory 
minimum. Banks may be optimising their capital 
structure, possibly much like non-financial firms, which 
would relegate capital requirements to second order 
importance (Gropp and Heider, 2010:590). Flannery 
(1994), Myers and Rajan (1998), Diamond and Rajan 
(2000) and Allen et al. (2011) develop theories of optimal 
bank capital structure, in which capital requirements are 
not necessarily binding. But what determines banks’ 
capital structures in Turkey? To answer the question, we 
analysis firm, industry, country and macroeconomic 
determinants of capital structure in Turkey. Turkish 
banks have become the focus of attention recently. Firm, 
country and macroeconomic determinants of capital 
structure is a subject of attention. This paper aims to 
contribute to the knowledge of capital structure by 
examining the determinants of capital structure across a 
large panel of banks and by focusing on both the 
characteristics of the bank and macroeconomic factors. In 
this article, we contribute to the empirical capital 
structure literature in the following ways. Our first 
contribution comes from assessing the importance of 
country-level factor for capital structure decisions and 
evaluating the relative importance of the country-specific 
factors in determining a firm's leverage compared with 
the firm-specific factors and industrial factors in Turkish 
banking sector. Second, we employ appropriate and 
advanced dynamic panel data estimators, Blundell and 
Bond’s (1998) generalized methods of moment’s 
estimators (System GMM, to estimate the determinants of 
capital structure. 
The paper is organized as follows: In the next 
section we provide an overview of the related research 
and capital structure theories. In Section 3 we introduce 
the data and the estimation methodology. Section 4 
contains the results, followed by a concluding section. 
 
2. CAPITAL STRUCTURE THEORIES 
AND DETERMINANTS OF CAPITAL 
STRUCTURE 
Concerning firm-level determinants of 
leverage, two main theoretical approaches are particularly 
important: the trade-off theory and the pecking order 
theory. These offer several predictions regarding to firm-
specific and country-specific factors affecting firm 
leverage. 
According to the trade-off theory, capital 
structure choices are determined by a trade-off between 
the benefits and costs of debt (Kraus and Litzenberger, 
1973). Classic arguments for this trade-off are based on 
bankruptcy costs, tax benefits, and agency costs related to 
asset substitution (Myers, 1977), and overinvestment 
(Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990). Each firm has a value-
maximizing target leverage ratio that it strives to reach 
(Gungoraydinoglu and Öztekin, 2011). As a result, 
although increased leverage mitigates the agency costs of 
equity, it exacerbates bondholder–shareholder conflicts 
(Drobetz et al, 2013). 
The pecking order theory (also referred to as 
the information asymmetry theory), developed by Myers 
and Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984), argues that the 
adverse selection costs of issuing risky securities, because 
of either asymmetric information (Myers, 1984; Myers 
and Majluf, 1984) or managerial optimism (Heaton, 
2002), lead to a preference ranking over financing 
sources by creating a wedge between internal and 
external financing costs and by increasing the difficulty 
of issuing securities. To minimize adverse selection costs, 
firms first issue internal funds, debt, and then equity 
(Gungoraydinoglu and Öztekin, 2011). There is no 
concept of target capital structure for a firm in the 
pecking order theory. The explanation provided by Myers 
for the pecking order theory is based on the assumption 
that firm insiders have more information than outsiders 
(Chakroborty, 2010). The pecking order theory ranks 
financing sources according to the degree they are 
affected by information asymmetry. As a result, firms use 
internal funds in the first place. If they need external 
funds, they prefer to issue debt over equity (Drobetz et al, 
2013:4). In contrast with the trade-off theory, the pecking 
order theory does not predict that firms have well-defined 
target leverage (Dang, 2013).  
These theories, in contrast to Modigliani and 
Miller’s (1958) assumption of a perfect market, suggest 
that several factors may determine firm leverage, either 
firm-internal or firm-external. A particular factor might 
be positive or negative depending on the theoretical lens.  
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2.1. Firm-Level Determinants 
Among the firm-level determinants of capital 
structure, we discuss profitability, size and tangibility. 
 
2.1.1. Profitability 
There is no consensus regarding the influence 
of profitability on capital structure. According to the 
pecking order theory, firms use internal sources of 
financing first and then go for external sources of 
financing. Firms with higher profitability will prefer 
internal financing to debt and hence a negative 
relationship is expected between profitability and 
leverage. Most empirical studies confirm the pecking 
order theory (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995; Booth et al., 2001; Fama and French, 
2002; Chen, 2004; Delcoure, 2007; Daskalakis and 
Psillaki, 2008; Chakraborty, 2010; Gropp and Heider, 
2010; Kayo and Kimura, 2011; Oztekin and Flannery, 
2012; Joeveer, 2013; Chakraborty, 2013; Dang, 2013). 
While profitability is frequently treated as a capital 
structure determinant, Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) 
propose a more direct approach to test the pecking order, 
contrarily to the studies that show evidence that pecking 
order does not hold (Frank and Goyal, 2003; Leary and 
Roberts, 2010). According to the trade-off theory, more 
profitable firms are supposed to have more debt-serving 
capacity and more taxable income to shield. Therefore, 
according to this theory, when firms are profitable they 
are likely to prefer debt to other sources in order to 
benefit from the tax shield. (Chakraborty, 2010). The 
trade-off hypothesis states a positive relationship because 
low profitability may increase bankruptcy risk. Hence a 
positive relationship is expected between profitability and 
leverage (Kaya and Kimura, 2011). A positive 
relationship would confirm the trade-off theory and a 
negative relationship would confirm the pecking order 
theory.  
2.1.2. Tangibility 
Asset tangibility is a measure for the level of a 
firm’s collateralizable value. From a trade-off 
perspective, one expects that firms with a higher ratio of 
fixed-to-total assets are subject to lower costs of financial 
distress, as tangible assets suffer from a smaller loss of 
value in case of bankruptcy. In addition, tangible assets 
are easier to value for outsiders, resulting in lower 
information asymmetry, less pronounced agency costs of 
debt, and a higher debt capacity. Therefore, the trade-off 
theory predicts a positive relationship between tangibility 
and leverage (Drobetz et al, 2013). However, the pecking 
order theory predicts that firms with less collateral face 
higher information costs and, thus, prefers debt to equity. 
In other words, collateral and target leverage are 
negatively related (Dang, 2013). Some studies report a 
significant positive relationship between tangibility and 
total debt (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995; Delcoure, 2007; Chakraborty, 2010; 
Gropp and Heider, 2010; Kayo and Kimura, 2011; Dang, 
2013). Wiwattanakantang (1999) and Chen (2004) 
observes a positive relationship between tangibility and 
leverage respectively in Thailand and China but Booth et 
al. (2001) for ten developing countries and Huang and 
Song (2006), Joeveer (2013), Oztekin and Flannery 
(2012) and Chakraborty (2013) find a negative 
relationship. The pecking order theory recognizes a 
negative relationship between tangibility and leverage, 
whereas the trade-off theory defends a positive one.  
2.1.3. Firm Size 
The effect of firm size on leverage is 
ambiguous. Larger firms tend to be more diversified and, 
thus, less prone to bankruptcy. Also, larger firms have 
better access to credit markets compared to smaller firms. 
In addition, larger firms have more diluted ownership 
leading to less control over managerial decisions 
(Delcoure, 2007). Larger firms with less asymmetric 
information problems should tend to have more equity 
than debt and hence have lower leverage (Chakroborty, 
2010). The larger firms face lower information costs and 
can raise equity capital more easily than the small firms. 
Therefore, in the presence of asymmetric information, 
firm size and target leverage may have a negative 
relation. Following the pecking order theory of capital 
structure, it is expected that the size of the firm will be 
negatively related to leverage. On the other hand, the 
trade-off theory suggests that large firms face lower 
financial distress and agency costs and, thus, are able to 
borrow more than small firms (Dang, 2013). The 
implication follows that firm size has a positive effect on 
target leverage. Some studies find positive relationship 
between firm sizes and leverage (Booth et al., 2001; 
Wiwattanakantang, 1999; Huang and Song, 2006; 
Delcoure, 2007; Daskalakis and Psillaki, 2008; Gropp 
and Heider, 2010; Kayo and Kimura, 2011; Lim, 2012; 
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Oztekin and Flannery, 2012; Joeveer, 2013; Dang, 2013), 
others observe that firm size is negatively related to 
leverage (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Bevan and Danbolt, 
2002; Titman and Wessels, 1988; Chakraborty, 2010; 
Gungoraydinoglu and Oztekin, 2011; Chakraborty, 
2013). A positive relationship between firm Size and 
leverage would confirm the trade-off theory and a 
negative relationship would confirm the pecking order. 
2.2. Country and Macroeconomic 
Determinants 
A remaining question is whether capital 
structure is driven by underlying macroeconomic factors 
which influence firms’ capital raising and induce them to 
choose different levels of leverage at different points 
(Erel et al., 2012). The business cycle can affect 
financing choices and leverage ratios. The demand-for-
capital mechanism is based on changes in information 
asymmetry between firms and investors over the business 
cycle. If the adverse selection costs associated with 
information asymmetry are negatively related to the 
business cycle, poor macroeconomic conditions will 
induce firms to issue less information-sensitive securities. 
Therefore, they tend to use less equity and more debt 
(Drobetz et al, 2013). The conjecture that macroeconomic 
conditions affect firms’ ability to raise capital seems 
particularly important for the banking industry that is 
affected by current financial crises around the world. 
Hence, we added model of the study country and 
macroeconomic determinants of capital structure. 
Following Ferson and Harvey (1994), De Jong et al 
(2008), we use inflation rate, GDP growth rate in order to 
control for the effects of countries economic conditions 
on capital structure.   
 
2.2.1. GDP Growth Rate 
Joeveer (2013) suggests that macroeconomic 
conditions may affect the leverage through the fact that 
they proxy the growth opportunities in the overall 
economy. Since equity financing is less common in 
Eastern Europe the investment opportunities will be 
mostly financed by debt and therefore they would expect 
GDP growth to be positively related to leverage (Joeveer, 
2013) and GDP growth has been found to be positively 
related to leverage. Therefore, GDP growth rate indicates 
growth opportunities in the overall economy. That is, it is 
can be evaluated that GDP growth contexts the pecking 
order theory and trade-off theory.  
Firms with higher growth opportunities would 
need more fund. According to the pecking order theory, 
there will be stronger preference for external financing, 
especially for debt (Chakraborty, 2010). The pecking 
order hypothesis predicts that firms with higher growth 
opportunities indicate the greater demand of capital, thus 
external fund is preferred through debt financing (Lim, 
2012). Rajan and Zingales (1995), Booth et al. (2001), 
Chen (2004), Delcoure (2007), Daskalakis and Psillaki 
(2008), Frank and Goyal (2009), Gropp and Heider 
(2010), Gungoraydinoglu and Öztekin (2011) and 
Drobetz et al (2013) find positive relationship between 
growth and leverage. On the other hand, According to the 
trade-off theory firms with high growth opportunities are 
likely to suffer from financial distress and the debt 
overhang problem (Myers, 1977). These firms have 
strong incentive to rely more on equity than on debt 
finance (Dang, 2013). In addition, Myers (1977) argued 
the negative relationship between growth and leverage 
from the perspective of agency costs. Firms with greater 
growth potential have more flexibility to have sub-
optimal behaviors, thus transferring the wealth from debt 
holders to shareholders (Lim, 2012). The findings of 
Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995), 
Kayo and Kimura (2011), Joeveer (2013) and Öztekin 
and Flannery (2012) confirmed trade-off theory. A 
negative relationship between GDP growth rate and 
leverage would confirm the trade-off theory and a 
positive relationship would confirm the pecking order.  
2.2.2. Inflation Rate 
Inflation is one of the main indicators of a 
country's stability. An increase in inflation rate brings 
about uncertainty in economic situation. This uncertainty 
causes firms' inability to repay their debts. Higher 
inflation decreases the benefits of leverage because of 
higher bankruptcy costs of debt imposed on firms 
(Gungoraydinoglu and Öztekin, 2011). In this case, 
lenders demand a higher return for the risk they 
undertake. Higher interest rate increases firm’s cost of 
debt expected, firms reduce debt ratios. In addition, in 
periods with higher inflation, firms use currently weak 
dollars to repay debt and lower their leverage ratios 
(Drobetz et al, 2013). Therefore, inflation has a negative 
effect on leverage. Joeveer (2012) maintains that 
expected inflation is predicted to be positively related to 
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leverage due to higher real value of tax deductions on 
debt. Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimoviç (1999), 
Gungoraydinoglu and Öztekin (2011), Öztekin and 
Flannery (2012), Drobetz et al (2013) and Joeveer (2013) 
find negative relationship between inflation and leverage.  
 
2.2.3. Financial Risk 
The overall aim of the financial risk rating is to 
provide a means of assessing a country’s ability to pay its 
way. In essence, this requires a system of measuring a 
country’s ability to finance its official, commercial, and 
trade debt obligations. According to ICRG Methodology, 
the financial risk includes following: foreign debt as a 
percentage of GDP, foreign debt service as a percentage 
of exports of goods and services, current account as a 
percentage of exports of goods and services, net 
international liquidity as months of import cover, 
exchange rate stability (ICRG, 2013). Hence, we added 
also financial risk index the model. Joeveer (2013) find 
negative relationship between country credit rating and 
leverage. To our knowledge, there are no studies on 
capital structure that consider financial risk as a 
determinant of leverage and this aspect is, we believe, 
one of the relevant contributions of our paper. Lastly, we 
analyze the influence of financial risk on firm leverage 
using the financial risk index from ICRG.  
2.2.4. Average industry leverage 
Studies on capital structure often employ 
dummy variables to control the effect of industry on 
leverage. It would be reasonable to suppose that specific 
characteristics of a given industry could also influence 
the firm capital structure. Therefore, following Joeveer 
(2013) and Frank and Goyal (2009), we analyze the 
influence of industry on firm leverage using the average 
industry leverage. Since the firm takes into account 
firms’ capital structure and leverage in the industry, 
average industry leverage is expected to be positively 
related to leverage. Frank and Goyal (2009), Oztekin and 
Flannery (2012) and Joeveer (2013) find positive 
relationship between average industry leverage and 
leverage. 
 
 
 
3. METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
Prior research has examined the factors that 
determine leverage (Flannery and Rangan, 2006; Frank 
and Goyal, 2005, 2009; Hovakimian et al., 2001, 2011). 
We follow the existing literature on the selection of the 
firm-specific factors affecting leverage but also 
incorporate country-specific macroeconomic factors that 
are theoretically important in a firm's determination of 
leverage (Cook and Tang, 2010; Frank and Goyal, 2009; 
Korajczyk and Levy, 2003). The lack of country-specific 
variability in their study, however, means that they are 
unable to measure macroeconomic factors, which is the 
focus of the present paper. 
The dynamic panel model in Eq. (1), (2), (3) 
and (4) requires instruments for the endogenous 
transformed lagged dependent variable (Baltagi, 2001) 
and other potentially endogenous explanatory variables. 
We use Blundell and Bond’s (1998) generalized methods 
of moments estimators (System GMM) methodology to 
estimate Eq. (1), (2), (3) and (4). The choice of our 
econometric model is essentially based on the following 
set of concerns: (i) the potential endogeneity of domestic 
savings; (ii) the dynamic relationship between domestic 
savings and investment as both are impacted by the prior 
values of each other; and (iii) unobserved country-
specific effects. We estimate the following two 
transformed models: 
Model 1a:  
LEV1it=ƔLEV1it1+β1IND1it+β2SIZEit+β3GRO
WTHit+β4INFit+β5TANGYit+β6ROAit+vit                    Eq. (1)                                                                                                  
Model 1b:  
LEV1it=ƔLEV1it1+β1IND1it+β2SIZEit+β3GRO
WTHit+β4INFit+β5TANGYit+β6ROAit+β7FINRISKit+vit  
Eq. (2)                                                                       
Model 2a: 
LEV2it=ƔLEV2it1+β1IND2it+β2SIZEit+β3GRO
WTHit+β4INFit+β5TANGYit+β6ROAit+vit                  Eq. (3)                                                                              
Model 2b:  
LEV2it=ƔLEV2it1+β1IND2it+β2SIZEit+β3GRO
WTHit+β4INFit+β5TANGYit+β6ROAit+β7FINRISKit+vit  
Eq. (4)                                                          
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Where subscripts i and t indicate bank and time 
period, respectively. β0 that is common to all recipient 
banks. IND represents average industry leverage. We use 
two average industry leverage measures: IND1 and IND2. 
IND1 is defined as average deposits plus liabilities to 
total equities, while IND2 is defined as average deposits 
plus liabilities to total book assets, SIZE is natural 
logarithm of assets as a proxy for the firm size, 
GROWTH is growth rate defined as the rate of change in 
the gross domestic product, INF is inflation rate 
measured by rate of change in the consumer price index, 
TANGY is tangibility by the ratio of fixed assets to total 
assets, ROA is profitability defined as the ratio of net 
profit to total assets, FINRISK is financial risk index 
from ICRG. 
Our sample consists of 39 banks covered in the 
Turkish banking sector during the period between 2002 
and 2012. There are several different leverage measures 
used in capital structure studies (see the discussion of 
leverage definitions in Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Banks’ 
capital structure fundamentally differs from the one of 
non-financial firms since it includes deposits etc., a 
source of financing generally not available to firms. 
Different rates in the banking sector are used to 
determine capital structure decisions. Fallowing studies 
(Nacour and Goaied, 2001; Bashir, 2003; Pratomo and 
İsmail, 2006), we use two leverage measures: LEV1 and 
LEV2. The two leverage measures used in this study 
differ from each other. LEV1 is defined as deposits plus 
liabilities to total equities, while LEV2 is defined as 
deposits plus liabilities to total book assets. The all data 
are on quarterly basis. The all firm-specific data used in 
this paper are taken from Banks Association of Turkey 
(BAT).  The country and macroeconomic variables are 
obtained from a variety of sources. GDP growth is 
obtained Turkey Statistical Institute (TSI). Inflation is 
taken from CBRT electronic data delivery system general 
statistics. Financial risk index data is taken from 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of all 
variables. The two measures of leverage differ sharply 
during the entire period 2002–2012. During the entire 
period 2002–2012, LEV1 is 0.492 whereas LEV2 is 
0.586.  As can be seen from Table 1; we get similar 
pictures for the industry leverage from the two alternative 
measures.  Size variable is a value between "0.7 "and 
"8.2”. Financial risk index value is changed "27.5" and 
"36.5" and the average value of its is "32.4". 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 2 reports the correlation coefficients 
between the variables. The two alternative measures of 
leverage are highly correlated, as the correlation 
coefficient is 0.639. 
 
Table 2: Correlation coefficients between 
variables 
 
 
 
 
Variables 
O
Obs. 
M
Mean 
S
Std. 
Dev. 
M
Min 
M
Max 
LEV1t-1 
1
560 
4
.4923 
3
.8549 
3
.8549 
4
7.6026 
LEV2t-1 
1
560 
.
5867 
.
3045 
.
3045 
6
.9392 
INDS1 
1
560 
.
6507 
.
0022 
.
6474 
.
6536 
INDS2 
1
560 
.
5847 
.
0006 
.
5837 
.
5860 
SIZE 
1
560 
5
.5728 
1
.7425 
.
7009 
8
.2306 
GROWTH 
1
560 
5
.3875 
5
.5005 
-
14.7 
1
2.6 
INF 
1
560 
1
46.66 
3
3.7394 
9
6 
2
07.5 
TANGY 
1
560 
.
0213 
.
0272 
.
0002 
.
3547 
ROA 
1
560 
.
0110 
.
0449 
-
.6323 
.
3221 
FINRISK 
1
560 
3
2.4500 
1
.8336 
2
7.5 
3
6.5 
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Among the explanatory variables, INF and 
SIZE are highly correlated with INDS 1, 2 (correlation 
coefficients are 0.9632 and 0.988, 0.639 and 0.559). 
Moreover, SIZE is highly correlated with two alternative 
measures of leverage, LEV1 and LEV2 (correlation 
coefficients are 0.270 and 0.252). A bank’s leverage 
correlates positively with SIZE, GROWTH and 
negatively with INDS, INF, TANGY, ROA and 
FINRISK variables. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND 
DISCUSSION 
Table 3 reports the empirical results from our 
estimations of target leverage, modeled by Equation 2, 3. 
All coefficients on firm-specific variables have expected 
signs. The results of all the model (Model 1a, b and 
Model 2a, b) are parallel to a large extent. Firm size 
variable is not statistically significant in Model 1a, b, 
while financial risk variable is not statistically significant 
in Model 2a, b. 
Table 3: Empirical results from estimations 
of target leverage the models. 
Independent 
Variables 
Model 1a Model 1b Model 2a Model 2b 
LEV1t-1 
0.603*** 
(0.0522) 
0.595*** 
(0.049) 
  
LEV2t-1 
  0.236** 
(0.114) 
0.232** 
(0.113) 
INDS1 
1.334*** 
(0.410) 
2.133*** 
(0.604) 
  
 
INDS2 
  0.991*** 
(0.222) 
0.980*** 
(0.220) 
SIZE 
0.291 
(0.099) 
0.049 
(0.095) 
0.008* 
(0.004) 
0.007* 
(0.004) 
GROWTH 
0.034*** 
(0.008) 
0.053*** 
(0.013) 
0.001*** 
(0.0004) 
0.001*** 
(0.0004) 
INF 
-0.019*** 
(0.006) 
-0.019*** 
(0.006) 
-0.001*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.001*** 
(0.0003) 
TANGY 
-47.477*** 
(18.019) 
48.247**  
(18.262) 
-2.087** 
(0.939) 
-2.104** 
(0.941) 
ROA 
-3.661** 
(1.749) 
-3.428** 
(1.620) 
-0.466** 
(0.212) 
-0.475** 
(0.216) 
FINRISK 
 -0.113*** 
(0.035) 
 0.0003 
(0.001) 
     
AR(2) 0.7236 0.7402 0.2540 0.2532 
Wald chi2 2116.03 2283.61 352.07 472.09 
F Prob. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Observations 1521 1521 1521 1521 
Banks 39 39 39 39 
Instruments 785 786 785 786 
 
Robust SEs of coefficients is reported in 
parentheses.  
*, ** and *** indicate the coefficient 
significant at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
The coefficient on average industry leverage is 
positive and statistically significant meaning that specific 
characteristics of a given industry influence the firm 
capital structure. This finding is consistent with the 
previous empirical evidence (e.g. Frank and Goyal, 2009; 
Oztekin and Flannery, 2012 and Joeveer, 2013). 
The results for Turkey banks show that 
leverage is significantly and positively associated with 
firm size. This finding is consistent with the trade-off 
theory that large firms face lower financial distress and 
agency costs and, thus, are able to borrow more than 
small firms. Empirically, this finding is consistent with 
the previous empirical evidence (e.g. Booth et al., 2001; 
Wiwattanakantang, 1999; Huang and Song, 2006; 
Delcoure, 2007; Antoniou et al., 2008; Daskalakis and 
Psillaki, 2008; Gropp and Heider, 2010; Kayo and 
Kimura, 2011; Lim, 2012; Oztekin and Flannery, 2012; 
Joeveer, 2013; Dang, 2013), 
Tangibility enters with negative and significant 
signs in the LEV1 and LEV2 regression. The negative 
influence of tangibility suggests that the collateral aspect 
of fixed assets is an important leverage driver for the 
countries in our sample. This finding is consistent with 
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the pecking order theory view that firms with less 
collateral face higher information costs and, thus, prefers 
debt to equity. Empirically, our finding is consistent with 
previous empirical evidence (e.g. Rajan and Zingales, 
1995; Brooth et al., 2001; Huang and Song, 2006; 
Antoniou et al., 2008; De Jong et al., 2008, Joeveer, 
2013; Oztekin and Flannery, 2012; and Chakraborty, 
2013). 
The coefficient on profitability is negative and 
statistically significant meaning that the more profitable 
firms are likely to have less debt. This finding appears to 
be most consistent with the pecking order theory’s 
prediction that firms with large profits and sufficient 
retained earnings are less likely to rely on debt financing. 
Empirically, our results are in line with the well-
documented international evidence on the relation 
between leverage and profitability (e.g. Titman and 
Wessels, 1988; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Booth et al., 
2001; Fama and French, 2002; Chen, 2004; Delcoure, 
2007; Daskalakis and Psillaki, 2008; Frank and Goyal, 
2009; Chakraborty, 2010; Gropp and Heider, 2010; Kayo 
and Kimura, 2011; Oztekin and Flannery, 2012; Joeveer, 
2013; Chakraborty, 2013; Dang, 2013). 
GDP growth has positive signs in both leverage 
regressions. This finding appears to be consistent with the 
pecking order theory’s prediction that firms with higher 
growth opportunities would need more fund and that 
firms with higher growth opportunities indicate the 
greater demand of capital, thus external fund is preferred 
through debt financing. Our finding is consistent with 
previous empirical evidence (e.g. Rajan and Zingales, 
1995; Booth et al., 2001; Chen, 2004; Delcoure, 2007; 
Daskalakis and Psillaki, 2008; Frank and Goyal, 2009; 
Gropp and Heider, 2010; Gungoraydinoglu and Öztekin, 
2011 and Drobetz et al, 2013) 
The inflation and financial risk index have 
negative signs in both leverage regressions confirming 
the predictions. The negative influence of inflation 
suggests that an increase in inflation rate brings about 
uncertainty in economic situation. This uncertainty 
causes firms' inability to repay their debts. Higher 
inflation decreases the benefits of leverage because of 
higher bankruptcy costs of debt imposed on firms. 
Lenders demand a higher return for the risk they 
undertake. Higher interest rate increases firm’s cost of 
debt expected, firms reduce debt ratios. Our results are in 
line with the international evidence on the relation 
between leverage and inflation (Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimoviç, 1999; Gungoraydinoglu and Öztekin, 2011; 
Öztekin and Flannery, 2012; Drobetz et al, 2013; and 
Joeveer, 2013).  
In sum, the regression results for leverage are 
both theoretically and empirically plausible for banks in 
Turkey. Moreover, tangibility, profitability and GDP 
growth are consistent with the predictions of the pecking 
order theory, while firm size is consistent with the 
predictions of the trade-off theory. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we study the importance of firm-
specific, country and macroeconomic factors for 
determining the capital structure of banks. The analysis is 
based on firm-level data from Turkish banking sector in 
2002–2012. We use two measures of leverage in this 
paper. 
This paper aims to contribute to the knowledge 
of capital structure by examining the determinants of 
capital structure across a large panel of banks and by 
focusing on both the characteristics of the bank and 
macroeconomic factors. In this article, we contribute to 
the empirical capital structure literature in the following 
ways. Our first contribution comes from assessing the 
importance of country-level factor for capital structure 
decisions and evaluating the relative importance of the 
country-specific factors in determining a firm's leverage 
compared with the firm-specific factors and industrial 
factors in Turkish banking sector. Second, we employ 
appropriate and advanced dynamic panel data estimators, 
Blundell and Bond’s (1998) generalized methods of 
moment’s estimators (System GMM), to estimate the 
determinants of capital structure. 
We find that leverage is significantly and 
positively associated with average industry leverage, firm 
size and GDP growth. We find also that leverage is 
significantly and negatively associated with tangibility, 
profitability, inflation and financial risk. Empirically, our 
results are in line with the well-documented international 
evidence on the relation between leverage and 
determinants. The regression results for leverage are both 
theoretically and empirically plausible for banks in 
Turkey. Moreover, tangibility, profitability and GDP 
growth are consistent with the predictions of the pecking 
order theory, while firm size is consistent with the 
predictions of the trade-off theory. 
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Our findings suggest that the capital structures 
of financial and non-financial firms are ultimately 
determined by the same drivers. In addition, our results 
have important managerial implications: they show that 
bank’s managers should focus a significant part of their 
attention on firm characteristics and cannot ignore the 
importance of external environments (e.g., industry, 
country, macroeconomics) when making financing 
decisions.  
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